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Abstract
This article studies the extent to which governments produce goods for the market
(that is, the extent of public enterprise production). It concludes that the current
literature dramatically understates the role of public enterprises in many low-
productivity countries. The current literature focuses on the total value of goods
produced by public enterprises. This article focuses on the types of goods they
produce. While the total value of goods produced by public enterprises (as a share
of total output) differs a bit across countries, the types of goods they produce differ
much more dramatically. In many low-productivity countries, the government
produces a large share of the country’s manufactured goods. In nearly all high-
productivity countries, the government stays out of the manufacturing sector
altogether. Therefore—and because the manufacturing sector plays a special role
in economies—this article concludes that public enterprises play a very large role
in many low-productivity countries.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.In this article, I study one aspect of national industrial pol-
icy: the extent to which governments decide that they will
produce and sell goods and services. The article’s theme is
thatmanylow-productivitycountrieshavepursuedamuch
more aggressive industrial policy (in this sphere) than is
typically recognized.
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When a government sets up an enterprise to produce
and sellgoods and services,the enterpriseis commonly re-
ferred to as a public enterprise. I will use that terminol-
ogy here. Examples of such enterprises are the U.S. Postal
Service and other countries’ steel companies (for example,
thoseinIrelandandHolland)andairlines(forexample,Air
France and Iberia). The purpose of the article, then, is to
explore the extent to which there are differences in the role
played by public enterprises across countries.
Public enterprises have, of course, been studied many
timesbefore,andthereisaconsensusthattheseenterprises
play a greater role in low- as compared to high-productiv-
ity countries. While I agree with this view, I disagree with
the assessment of how much the role differs. In particular,
as I suggested above, I think the current literature dramati-
cally understates the role played by these enterprises in
many low-productivity countries.
My argument is a simple one. The current literature fo-
cuses on the total value of goods and services produced by
public enterprises. I focus on the types of goods they pro-
duce.Whilethe totalvalueofgoodsand servicesproduced
by public enterprises (as a share of total output) differs a
bit across countries, the types of goods they produce differ
much more dramatically. In many low-productivity coun-
tries, the government produces a large share of the coun-
try’s manufactured goods. In nearly all high-productivity
countries, the government stays out of the manufacturing
sector. It is based on this fact, and the fact that the manu-
facturing sector plays a special role in economies, that I
say low-productivity countries have pursued a much more
aggressive industrial policy (in this sphere) than is typical-
ly recognized.
2 For the remainder of the introduction, let
me develop this argument more fully.
As mentioned, the role, or impact, of public enterprises
is often measured by the public enterprise share of gross
domesticproduct(GDP).Forexample,inarguingthatpub-
lic enterprises played an important role in Taiwan’s econo-
my during its rapid growth, Rodrik (1995, p. 90) points to
the fact that the public enterprise share of GDP “actually
increased during the critical take-off years of the 1960s.”
To further buttress his point, Rodrik (1995, p. 90) writes,
“Public enterprises actually accounted for a larger share of
GDP in Taiwan than in such ‘socialist’ developing coun-
tries as India and Tanzania.”
This measure is also explored in a recent report of the
World Bank (1995). Using the public enterprise share of
GDP as a measure of policy, the report concludes that pub-
lic enterprises play a greater role in low- as compared to
high-productivitycountries.Butthedifferencesarenotdra-
matic. The report shows that over the period 1978–88, the
average public enterprise share of GDP was about 8 per-
centinindustrializedcountriesandbetween10percentand
12percentindevelopingcountries.(Withinthedeveloping
world, the average in Africa was about 14 percent over the
period.)Afewlow-productivitycountrieshadpublicenter-
prise shares of GDP in the range from 20 percent to 35
percent. These few countries, therefore, had public enter-
prise shares of GDP that were on the order of, say, three
times that of the high-productivity country average.
When I examine the public enterprise share of output
by sector, I ﬁnd that the public enterprise share of manu-
facturing output is often much higher in low-productivity
countries than in high-productivity ones. In industrialized
countries,thepublicenterpriseshareofmanufacturingout-
put is typically only a few percent, and often it is zero.
But in the low-productivity world, many countries have a
public enterprise share of manufacturing output that is in
the 30–70 percent range. Many of the countries in this
range have a public enterprise share of manufacturing out-
put that is on the order of, say, 15 times that of the high-
productivity country average. When I take the public en-
terprise share of manufacturing output, and not public en-
terprises’ share of aggregate output, as a measure of the
role played by public enterprises, then I am led to the
theme stated above: many low-productivity countries have
pursued a much more aggressive industrial policy than is
typically recognized.
But why take the public enterprise share of manufac-
turing output as a measure of the role played by public en-
terprises? Let me give two reasons. First, the manufactur-
ing sector produces the lion’s share of investment goods.
This sector produces such ﬁnal goods as machines and
transportation equipment and such intermediate goods as
metals and building materials that are used to produce
these ﬁnal investment goods and other investment goods
(in the construction industry). Hence, the efficiency of the
manufacturing sector inﬂuences the incentives to accumu-
late capital. If, for example, the only difference between
public enterprises and private ones is that public ones are
terribly inefficient at producing goods, then a govern-
ment’s decision that its production should account for a
larger share of output in the manufacturing sector will
have the effect of increasing the cost of investment. This
will lead to less capital accumulation and lower productiv-
ity.
3 (Note that increasing the government’s share of man-
ufacturing output may have little effect on the public en-
terprise share of GDP if the manufacturing share of GDP
falls as a consequence.)
Second,othergoods,besidesinvestmentgoods,arepro-
duced in the manufacturing sector. Some of these goods
are textiles and processed food. Some of these industries
are referred to as light manufacturing industries. Many
economists have emphasized the importance of the learn-
ing that goes on in these industries as being helpful in
production at more complex tasks, such as manufacturing
chemicals and instruments. If these light manufacturinggoods are produced by the government, the nature and ex-
tent of learning in these industries may be very different
than if these goods were privately produced.
Let me now brieﬂy describe the remainder of the arti-
cle. In the next section, I brieﬂy discuss deﬁnitions and
data issues. I then review the evidence on the public
enterprise share of GDP (taken from Short 1984), show-
ing that in a cross section of countries, there is no strong
correlation between this statistic and aggregate productivi-
ty. I then examine the public enterprise share of manufac-
turing output (takenfrom Short and various othersources),
showing that in a cross section of countries, there is a
strong negative correlation between this statistic and pro-
ductivity.Thesetwocrosssectionsillustratethattwocoun-
tries may have the same public enterprise share of GDP,
yetdramaticallydifferentpublicenterprisesharesofmanu-
facturing output. For example, during the middle 1970s,
Bangladesh and Denmark had similar public enterprise
shares of GDP, about 6 percent, yet Bangladesh’s public
enterpriseshareofmanufacturingoutputwasabout70per-
cent and Denmark’s was 0 percent. Tanzania and the Unit-
ed Kingdom had similar public enterprise shares of GDP,
about 12 percent, yet Tanzania’s public enterprise share of
manufacturingoutputwas38percentandtheUnitedKing-
dom’s was 3 percent.
I next demonstrate that these patterns found in the cross
section of countries can be seen in the time series of indi-
vidualcountries.Inparticular,Ishowthatduringthe1950s
and 1960s, Taiwan cut its public enterprise share of manu-
facturing output from 56 percent to 21 percent and ul-
timately to 10 percent by 1990, yet its public enterprise
share of GDP changed little over this period—ﬂuctuating
between about 12 percent and 17 percent.
I next brieﬂy examine the experiences of two current-
ly industrialized countries—Great Britain and the United
States—during their period of development. I ask whether
they, like many developing countries today, pursued an ag-
gressive industrial policy (as measured by the public en-
terprise share of manufacturing output) when they were
developing. The answer is no. If anything, the public en-
terprise share of manufacturing output is higher today
(though, again, the share is very small) than it was when
they were developing.
Before proceeding, let me restate that my goal is to ex-
plore the role of public enterprises around the world, ask-
ing what countries have pursued the most aggressive in-
dustrial policy. For most of the article, I avoid making
judgments as to the soundness of such policies. I cross
that line in the conclusion. There I discuss some of my in-
terpretations of the data I present below.
Deﬁnitions and Data Issues
In this section, I discuss some of the issues that need to be
addressed when studying public enterprise data. Let me
begin by considering the general issue of classifying enter-
prises.
Organizations or enterprises that produce output can be
classiﬁed in several ways. For example, three ways are by
asking (1) Is the enterprise owned by the government or
by private individuals? (2) Does the enterprise sell its out-
put or provide it free of charge? (3) Who are the enter-
prise’s customers: the government or private individuals?
Of course, not every enterprise can be neatly classiﬁed ac-
cording to these criteria; for example, some enterprises are
partially owned by the government. But let’s ignore these
difficulties for the moment. Then according to these crite-
ria, there are eight possible enterprise types. Now, private
enterprises typically sell their output, so, in fact, there are
six possible types. Let me enumerate them, giving an ex-
ample from the United States for each.
There are two privately owned enterprise types that sell
their output: those that sell to individuals (like your local
barber) and those that sell to government (like defense
contractors). There are two government-owned enterprise
types that provide output free of charge: those that provide
to individuals (like public elementary schools) and those
that provide to government (like the General Accounting
Office).Therearetwogovernment-ownedenterprisetypes
that sell their output: those that sell to individuals (like the
postal service and some electrical utilities) and those that
sell to government. There are typically none of these latter
enterprises, so there are really ﬁve distinct types according
to the three criteria above.
In the national income and product accounts, the ﬁrst
two criteria (and not the third) are used to distinguish en-
terprises for some purposes. So, in particular, when output
is assigned to different sectors (that is, the business, gov-
ernment, and household sectors) of the economy, three
types of enterprises are contrasted: private, government
that provide output free of charge, and government that
sell output. The output of all privately owned (nonhouse-
hold) enterprises is attributed to the business sector in the
nationalaccounts.Theoutputofgovernment-ownedenter-
prises that provide output free of charge is attributed to the
government sector in the national accounts. The output of
government-owned enterprises that sell output to private
individuals is attributed to the business sector in the na-
tional accounts.
The government-owned enterprises that sell output to
private individuals are those deﬁned as public enterprises.
Being a bit more formal, a standard deﬁnition in the litera-
tureisthatpublicenterprisesaregovernment-ownedenter-
prises that engage in commercial activities—that is, they
selloutput—andthathave marketsaleswhichcoverasub-
stantial portion of operating costs. This is the deﬁnition
used by Short (1984), whose data I study below.
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My motivation for examining public enterprises, as de-
ﬁned by Short, is that these enterprises produce goods that
private enterprises could produce (and do, in other coun-
tries).
A number of issues need to be considered when public
enterprise data are used. Let me describe a few importantones. First, there is the issue of data comparability across
countries. The meanings of government-owned and sub-
stantial portion of operating costs may differ across coun-
tries. Hence, some enterprises might be classiﬁed as pri-
vate in some countries and public in others. This is a diffi-
cult problem. The only recourse I have is to use data (such
as Short’s) that attempt to reconcile statistics across coun-
tries.
Second, the signiﬁcance one wants to assign to the lev-
el of public enterprise production may differ across sec-
tors. For example, the United States has a public enter-
prise share of electricity output that is lower than that in
most countries. It has a lower share in manufacturing as
well. But whereas private enterprises in electricity are reg-
ulated in many ways in the United States, those in manu-
facturing face far fewer government restrictions on their
business practices. Hence, the signiﬁcance one assigns to
the low public enterprise share of manufacturing output
may differ from that assigned to the electricity observa-
tion.
Third, given that one may assign different degrees of
signiﬁcance to the level of public enterprise production
across sectors and given that sectoral shares of output vary
across countries, one wants to take care in comparing pub-
lic enterprise shares of GDP across countries.
The Public Enterprise Share of GDP
In this section, I brieﬂy review the evidence concerning
the public enterprise share of GDP. I use Short 1984 as
my source for data. In constructing his data, Short made
a large effort to ensure comparability of data across coun-
tries. It was difficult to do. In his words (1984, p. 111),
“an attempt was made to adjust the statistics to a common
deﬁnition . . . . This met with only partial success. How-
ever, as much of the basic information has not previously
been brought together, it was decided to err on the side of
comprehensiveness rather than comparability in choosing
which statistics to include.” Though Short acknowledges
that his statistics are still subject to some error, I know of
no better statistics.
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Short provides observations on the public enterprise
share of GDP for a wide range of countries. For some
countries, he provides a single observation (typically an
average of the public enterprise share of GDP for a three-
year period), while for other countries, he provides two or
more observations. (Again, an observation is usually an
average for a three-year period.) The bulk of the observa-
tions are from the 1960s and 1970s. In total, there are 118
observations (from 42 countries) on the public enterprise
share of GDP. (See Appendix A.)
In order to summarize the relationship between public
enterprise production and productivity in countries, I need
a way to compare productivity in different countries at a
point in time as well as at different points in time (since
the observations on countries occur in different years).
I will use the international (constant) dollar series con-
structed by Summers and Heston (1991) for this purpose.
I will express all productivity as a percentage of U.S. pro-
ductivity in 1985. (This relative productivity of individual
countries appears in Appendix A.)
In Chart 1, I plot the 118 observations on the public
enterprise share of GDP against each country’s relative
productivity in the year associated with the observation.
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(The numbers used for Chart 1 are in Appendix A.) As is
easily seen, there is no strong correlation between the pub-
lic enterprise share of GDP and relative productivity. Be-
ing a bit more formal, I categorize relative productivity in-
to four groups: less than 20 percent, 21–40 percent, 41–60
percent, and greater than 60 percent. For these groups, the
average public enterprise shares of GDP are 9.2 percent,
11.5 percent, 9.1 percent, and 10.7 percent, respectively,
with standard deviations of 7.0, 7.5, 3.2, and 5.1. Hence,
as I move from low- to high-productivity countries, the
average public enterprise share of GDP does not change
much, though the variability in the share decreases.
There is a single high-productivity country that has a
public enterprise share of GDP greater than 25 percent.
That observation in Chart 1 corresponds to Venezuela. Its
share is high primarily because its state-owned mining and
minerals sector accounts for about 25 percent of GDP. (I
am not sure why its reported productivity is so high.) Be-
sides Venezuela, there are three low-productivity countries
that have a public enterprise share of GDP around 25 per-
cent, two greater than 35 percent. Hence, under this mea-
sure, those countries pursuing the most aggressive indus-
trial policy have a public enterprise share of GDP that is
on the order of three times that of the high-productivity
country average (of about 10 percent).
Recall that the World Bank (1995) concludes that over
the period 1978–88, the public enterprise share of GDP
was higher in developing as opposed to industrialized
countries (though the differences were very small: 10 or
12 percent versus 8 percent). In contrast, I ﬁnd little dif-
ference using Short’s data. What accounts for the disparity
in results? The World Bank report uses data for a larger
number of countries than Short. It uses data from Short
and a number of other sources. There is not much descrip-
tion of how these sources relate to each other, so I prefer
to employ Short’s data when examining the public enter-
prise share of GDP.
When I examine the public enterprise share of manu-
facturing output in the next section, there is no choice to
make between these two sources. The World Bank report
does not give public enterprise output shares by sector.
Short does.
The Public Enterprise Share
of Manufacturing Output
I now examine some cross-sectional data on the public en-
terprise share of manufacturing output. I ﬁrst look at data
from Short 1984. Short has data for a large number of
low-productivity countries but for only a few at the high-productivity end. Hence, I have supplemented Short’s data
with data from other sources for high-productivity coun-
tries. I discuss these data after Short’s.
Short’s Data
Short (1984) presents public enterprise shares of sectoral
output for a limited set of countries. The sectoral break-
down employed by Short is the following: agriculture,
mining, manufacturing, electricity (and gas and water),
construction, wholesale and retail trade, and transport and
communication. These sectors are often referred to as ma-
jor sectors, and they are similar to those in the one-digit
industry breakdown used by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce.
In Chart 2, I plot the public enterprise share of manu-
facturing output against relative productivity.
7 (The num-
bers used for Chart 2 are in Appendix A.) As is easily
seen, there is a strong negative correlation between the
public enterprise share of manufacturing output and rel-
ative productivity.
8 Compare this correlation to that in
Chart 1.
Though the pattern is striking, there are very few high-
productivity countries in Short’s data. The observations on
high-productivity countries in Chart 2 are from Australia
and Austria only. Hence, I have supplemented Short’s da-
tabygettingobservationsonotherhigh-productivitycoun-
tries. I describe those data now.
Some European Countries and the United States
My goal in supplementing Short’s data is to get more
information on high-productivity countries. I ﬁrst discuss
data collected in Keyser and Windle 1978. This is a study
of public enterprises in a large number of European coun-
tries. Let me summarize each country’s report with regard
to the information available on the public enterprise share
of manufacturing output. For some countries, it is possible
to determine the public enterprise share of manufacturing
output; for others, the public enterprise share of manufac-
turing employment.
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Some countries in Europe had essentially no public en-
terprises in the manufacturing sector—Belgium and Den-
mark, for example.
In some countries, public enterprises accounted for a
positive but very small share of manufacturing output.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the public enterprise
share of manufacturing output was 3 percent in 1975.
Two of the countries with the largest shares are Italy
and France. In Italy, the public enterprise share of manu-
facturing employment averaged 7.6 percent over the peri-
od 1971–73. In France, the public enterprise share of man-
ufacturing employment was 4.1 percent in 1973.
I estimate that for the United States, the public enter-
prise share of manufacturing output is zero. (See the dis-
cussion on the United States below.)
I think these numbers are representative of the rest of
the industrialized world.
Some Large Differences Across Countries
To show the contrast between the industrialized world and
at least some of the developing world, I list the estimates
for the public enterprise share of manufacturing output for
European countries and the United States in the ﬁrst col-
umn of the accompanying table. I also list in that column
numbers for Australia and Austria that are available from
Short. In the second column of the table, I list some of the
largest public enterprise shares of manufacturing output
that I have seen for the developing world. Some of these
numbers are from Short; some are from other sources.
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(See the table for speciﬁc sources.) The observations in
the second column of the table are, again, not a random
sample, but a sample of some of the countries in which
public enterprises play a big role in manufacturing. This
is by no means a complete list. There are other countries
where public enterprises play a big role in manufacturing,
such as Ghana and Turkey.
Recall that when I used the public enterprise share of
GDP as a measure, those low-productivity countries pur-
suing the most aggressive industrial policy had measures
on the order of three times those of the high-productivity
country average. When I use the public enterprise share of
manufacturing output as a measure, those countries pur-
suing the most aggressive industrial policy have measures
on the order of 15 times those of the high-productivity
country average (which is on the order of 3–5 percent).
Tosummarize,if thetwo reasons(onebasedon thecost
of producing investment goods and the other on the extent
of learning) given earlier for focusing on manufacturing
are tenable, then many low-productivity countries are pur-
suing an industrial policy that is much more aggressive
than is typically recognized.
Finally, each reason for focusing on the government’s
role in manufacturing production suggests examination of
a different group of subsectors in manufacturing. Data on
government production in such detail are hard to obtain.
At this point, I have been able to collect data for a few
countries (Bangladesh, Taiwan, and Turkey.) I will shortly
discuss the Taiwanese data.
Taiwan: A Look Over Time
and Within Manufacturing
In this section, I show that the same patterns found in the
two cross sections above can be found in the time series
for individual countries. I focus here on the experience of
Taiwan. I begin by presenting the time series evidence on
the public enterprise share of manufacturing output. Then
Idiscusspublicenterpriseoutputsharesforindustrieswith-
in manufacturing.
Manufacturing: A Look Over Time
In Chart 3, I plot the public enterprise share of GDP and
the public enterprise share of manufacturing output in Tai-
wan over the period 1952–90. The data used to construct
the chart are from Schive 1995.
11 The public enterpriseshare of manufacturing output declined dramatically over
this period. From 1952 to 1970, the share fell from 56.2
percent to 20.6 percent, a drop of 63 percent. By 1990,
the share was 10.6 percent. At the aggregate, economy-
wide level, there was not much change over the entire pe-
riod. (The data for the chart are listed in Appendix B.)
Again, if some of the reasons given for focusing on
manufacturing are tenable, then this cut in the public en-
terprise share of manufacturing output means that there
was a signiﬁcant decrease in the role of public enterprises
in Taiwan over this period.
Manufacturing: A Look Within
For Taiwan, information is available for the public enter-
prise share of output for industries within manufacturing.
Suchindustriesareoftengroupedunderthecategoriescon-
sumer goods, intermediate goods, and capital goods. Dur-
ing the early 1950s, there was a large public enterprise
presence in all three categories of manufacturing in Tai-
wan.
For example, consider the year 1954. Within the con-
sumer goods industries, the public enterprise share of out-
put was 60 percent in food processing, 86 percent in bev-
erages, and 15 percent in textiles. Within the intermediate
goods industries, that is, industries that provide goods used
to produce investment goods, the public enterprise share
of output was 55 percent in basic metals (for example,
steel). In nonmetallic mineral products (for example, ce-
ment), there were no public enterprises. Within the capital
goods industries, the public enterprise share of output was
43 percent in machinery, 37 percent in transport equip-
ment, and 65 percent in metal products. In electrical ma-
chinery, there were no public enterprises.
Starting in the mid-1950s, Taiwan began to cut its pub-
lic enterprise share of output in all these industries. Some
of the steepest cuts came in the capital goods industries.
For example, from 1954 to 1964, the public enterprise
share of output in machinery fell from 43 percent to 15
percent, in transport equipment from 37 percent to 5 per-
cent, and in metal products from 65 percent to 22 percent.
(The data reported above are from Industry of Free China,
November 1965.)
A Peek at the Past: Great Britain
and the United States
Using the public enterprise share of manufacturing output
as a measure of the industrial policy stance of countries,
I have shown that many developing countries pursue a
much more aggressive policy than the typical industrial-
ized country. An interesting question is whether the cur-
rent industrialized countries also pursued a more aggres-
sive policy when they had lower aggregate productivity.
The answer, for the few countries that I have examined,
is no. If anything, the public enterprise share of manufac-
turing output is higher in the industrialized countries today
than it was when they were developing (though, again, the
share is very small). Let me discuss the experiences of two
countries: Great Britain and the United States.
Great Britain
I base my discussion of Great Britain on two studies that
addressissuesinthehistoricaldevelopmentofpublicown-
ership in that country: Foreman-Peck and Millward 1994
and Millward and Singleton 1995.
Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994) discuss the history
of public ownership (and government intervention more
generally) in the period from 1820 to recently. According
to them, public ownership before World War II was lim-
ited to what they term the network industries: electricity,
gas, and water and transport and communication. The his-
tory of government intervention in the network industries
(or utilities) before World War II was brieﬂy as follows.
There was little government involvement in these utili-
ties during their early development, what Foreman-Peck
and Millward refer to as the competitive era, 1820–60.
According to Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994, p. 4),
the period from 1860 until World War I saw
closer railway regulation by Parliament, nationalization of
telegraphy, and acquisition by the larger local government
units of 40 per cent of gas undertakings and 80 per cent of
water undertakings, together with roughly 60 per cent of the
undertakings in the new industries of electricity and trams.
Much was however still in private ownership.
Between the world wars, government ownership was
extendedtosomeotherbitsofthenetworkindustries,most
notably broadcasting. (The British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion was established in 1922.) So, until after World War
II, the story of public ownership in Great Britain was a
rather simple one. Public ownership was a feature only in
the network industries. There was very little public owner-
ship at ﬁrst; the extent of ownership increased over time.
Unlike in many developing countries today, in Great Brit-
ain there was little or no public ownership in manufactur-
ing.
After World War II, the Labour Party came to power
in Great Britain. The Labour Party had plans to extend
publicownershiptomanymoresectorsoftheBritishecon-
omy. Clause 4 of the Labour Party’s constitution called
for “the common ownership of the means of production,
distribution, and exchange, and the best obtainable system
of popular administration and control of each industry or
service” (Singleton 1995, p. 14). The Labour Party wanted
to nationalize those utilities that were not already owned
by the national government. (Some were privately owned;
some were owned by local governments.) It also wanted
to nationalize a wider range of industries, from some in
the mining sector to some in the manufacturing sector.
The list of potential industries to be nationalized included
coal, steel, sugar, cement, meat supply, and cotton. While
the Labour Party’s plans were ambitious, the extent of ac-
tual nationalizations was limited. The major ones outside
of the utilities were steel and coal. So, even at its heights,public ownership in Great Britain did not extend, to any
great extent, into the manufacturing sector.
During the 1980s, as is well known, Great Britain re-
versed most of the nationalizations that occurred under the
LabourPartygovernment.(SeeVickersandYarrow1988.)
The United States
In contrast to Great Britain, which experienced a small in-
crease in government production in manufacturing over
time, the United States has always had very little such
production. There was some government manufacturing
during wartime. For example, in both World War I and
World War II, the U.S. Navy engaged in some shipbuild-
ing. There are other examples of government wartime pro-
duction as well. For nonwar periods, my guess is that there
has been no, or only trivial amounts of, government manu-
facturing production.
I base the above conclusions on three exercises. First,
I examined the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Govern-
ment Transactions (1988, p. 75), which lists all federal
government enterprises.
12 There are very few such enter-
prises. The only one that might be classiﬁed as a manu-
facturing enterprise is the Government Printing Office
Sales Fund.
13 Second, I examined issues of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce’s Census of Manufactures going
back to 1900 and earlier. In these publications, there are
breakdowns of government production from private pro-
duction. The only goods I have seen that are produced
by the government are a few military goods I alluded to
above (produced, again, during war-related years). For
example, data on government shipbuilding are found in
these publications.
My third exercise was to examine the U.S. Bureau of
the Census’ Historical Statistics of the United States
(1975). This provides data on national income originating
in various sectors of the U.S. economy over the period
1929–70, including government commercial enterprises.
(See Series F 192–209, p. 237.) The income originating in
this sector is very small—it is on the order of 1 or 2 per-
cent of nonagricultural income. (Nonagricultural income
is obtained from Series F 226–237, p. 239.) Moreover, I
can account for most of the income originating in these
government commercial enterprises by summing the in-
come from two sources in the Historical Statistics of the
United States that I know are classiﬁed as government en-
terprises: the postal service and publicly owned utilities.
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After subtracting the income originating in the postal ser-
vice and publicly owned utilities from the total, the residu-
al is trivial compared to manufacturing production. (And
my guess is that none of that residual comes from manu-
facturing.) Hence, over the period 1929–70, there was
very little government production in manufacturing.
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Conclusion
In summary, the public enterprise share of manufacturing
output may be a better measure of the industrial policy of
countries than the aggregate public enterprise share. Un-
der the manufacturing measure, I have shown that many
low-productivity countries have pursued a much more ag-
gressive industrial policy than is typically recognized.
As a way to conclude, let me discuss two issues. The
ﬁrst issue concerns measurement. The second issue con-
cerns theory and interpretation.
One issue is that government production is only one
aspect of government industrial policy. It would be useful
to know how this type of government intervention is re-
lated to other types. For example, perhaps those govern-
ments that produce manufactured goods are not heavily
involved in other types of regulation in this sector. (And
perhaps those governments that do not produce manufac-
tured goods are heavily involved in regulating manufac-
turing, and so on.) My impression is that this is not true.
Compared to the United States, countries in Europe have
greaterpublicproductioninmanufacturingaswellasmore
intervention of other types (for example, greater subsidies
to private businesses). In the same way, compared to Eu-
ropean countries, many low-productivity countries have
greaterpublicproductioninmanufacturingaswellasmore
intervention of other types (for example, signiﬁcant barri-
ers to imports of manufactured goods).
The other issue goes beyond measurement. My goal in
this article has been to explore the role of public enter-
prises around the world, asking what countries have pur-
suedthemostaggressiveindustrialpolicies.Ihaveavoided
makingjudgmentsastothesoundnessofsuchpolicies.Let
me cross that line now. There are, of course, two interpre-
tations of the negative correlation between aggregate pro-
ductivity and the public enterprise share of manufacturing
output. One is that government production is needed in
manufacturingwhencountriesarejuststartingthedevelop-
ment process.
16 After development has begun and higher
aggregate productivity is achieved, government can leave
the manufacturingbusiness.The otherinterpretationisthat
government production in manufacturing causes these
countries to have low productivity.
I lean toward the second interpretation. One reason is
that the experiences of Great Britain and the United States
show that government production in manufacturing is not
a necessary condition for development. The world is cer-
tainly a different place todaythan when these countriesde-
veloped. But their experiences are still instructive.
The case of Taiwan is also instructive. Recall that
Taiwan’s time series mirrors the cross-sectional relation-
ship between aggregate productivity and the public enter-
prise share of manufacturing output. In Taiwan, the se-
quence of events was not as laid out in the ﬁrst interpre-
tation above—that ﬁrst the government became involved
inmanufacturingproduction,thenthecountrybegantode-
velop,andthenthegovernmentwithdrewfromproduction.
No, as far as I can tell, the facts are that the economy be-
gantodevelop afterthegovernmentwithdrewfrommanu-
facturing production.I have other reasons for leaning toward the second in-
terpretation. Plenty of studies show that public enterprises
are less efficient and less proﬁtable than private ones.
(SomeofthesestudiesareBorcherding,Pommerehne, and
Schneider1982;BoardmanandVining1989;Galal,Jones,
Tandon, and Vogelsang 1994; and Megginson, Nash, and
van Randenborgh 1994.) Of course, the government may
enter manufacturing production because of failures in the
market. In this case, production efficiency and proﬁtability
may not be appropriate criteria on which to judge these en-
terprises. An important question, then, is whether one has
conﬁdence that government production in manufacturing
(and other forms of intervention) will arise in these cases
of market failure (and primarily in these cases).
I think that experience with government policymaking
provides a sober view of the ability of governments to
intervene in the “correct” instances to ﬁx markets. That
is the view of Krueger (1990) concerning the developing
world. That seems to be just as true of the industrialized
world. If one looks at Europe, government production in
manufacturing seems to be directed at saving jobs. Most
government manufacturing production in Europe occurs
in the declining steel and shipbuilding industries.
17 Even
the ability of Japanese industrial policy to pick the win-
ning industries has been challenged. Beason and Wein-
stein(1994)documentthatthoseindustrieswhichreceived
the greatest amount of (relative) government support in Ja-
pan were textiles and mining, two industries that were in
relative decline.
My ﬁnal remark is on politics or political economy. I
mentioned two, according to my criteria, success cases:
Taiwan (which cut its public enterprise share of manufac-
turing output) and Great Britain (which overcame pres-
sures to increase its share). Why were these governments
able to succeed? Well, one common thread to their experi-
ences was outside pressure from the United States to limit
government manufacturing production. (See Appendix C
for a brief discussion of these historical experiences.)
*The author is grateful to Jason Schmidt for his signiﬁcant help in preparing this
article and to Tianshu Chu for bringing some of the Taiwanese data to the author’s at-
tention. The author is grateful as well for comments from Ed Green, Pete Klenow,
Rody Manuelli, and Antonio Merlo and for extensive discussions with Tom Holmes
and Richard Rogerson.
1Productivity is deﬁned throughout the article as output per worker.
2For brevity, I will drop the qualiﬁer in this sphere for the remainder of the article,
though the reader should keep in mind that public enterprises are only one dimension
of industrial policy.
3In this example, I imagined that governments produce investment goods at higher
costs than private enterprises. Obviously, one could take the opposite view and still be
led to the conclusion that government production in this sector has an important impact
on capital accumulation (now a positive impact).
4Note that in the national income and product accounts of the United States, the
enterprises that Short calls public enterprises are called government enterprises. (See
U.S. Department of Commerce 1988.)
5Note that Short’s data, as well as data in most other sources that I have seen, in-
clude nonﬁnancial public enterprises only.
6Note that in Chart 1, I plot all the observations that Short provides. For example,
if a given country has an observation for two different time periods, I plot both obser-
vations. I follow this convention in Chart 2 as well.
7For most of the countries, Short was able to obtain data for the manufacturing
sector by itself. However, for other countries, Short was only able to obtain data that
combinemanufacturingwitheitherminingorelectricity.Thesesectors(miningandelec-
tricity) are typically a much smaller share of GDP than is manufacturing (even in low-
productivity countries), and for this reason I include them in Chart 2.
8Note that, as can be seen in Appendix A, some countries have observations in
Chart 1 but not in Chart 2, and vice versa. Some countries have observations in both
Charts 1 and 2.
9Since these numbers were not collected by Short, there is obviously a potential
issue of comparability.
10Again, there is a potential issue of comparability here.
11Note that Short (1984) provides data on the public enterprise share of GDP for
Taiwan, and these data are used for Chart 1. Short, however, does not provide data for
manufacturing in Taiwan. Schive (1995) does provide data on manufacturing. So, to
be consistent, when I use Schive’s numbers for manufacturing, I use his numbers for
the aggregate economy as well.
12RecallthatinU.S.documents,itisstandardtocallpublicenterprises government
enterprises.
13There could be government manufacturing at the state and local levels, but I
doubt there is any of much consequence.
14The income originating in the postal service can be estimated using postal ser-
vice employment (Series Y 308–317, p. 1102) and postal service wages (Series D
765–778, p. 168). Income originating in publicly owned utilities can be estimated using
those utilities’ share of all electricity generation (derived from Series S 44–52, p. 821)
and the electrical utility industry’s share of national income.
15I should mention that there are some limitations with public enterprise data in
the U.S. Bureau of the Census’ Historical Statistics of the United States (1975). First,
the data comprise payments to factors of production in enterprises and not value added.
The payment to factors in public enterprises will overstate the value added if the enter-
prise receives subsidies. In the United States, these subsidies are typically very small.
Another limitation is that the data go back to only 1929. The United States had already
achieved a much higher level of development at that time than many developing coun-
tries have achieved today.
16This might be the case, for example, if there were severe market failures. Such
failures, and the absence of government intervention, might cause a country’s produc-
tivity to remain low.
17See, for example, Ford and Suyker 1990, which presents evidence on the subsi-
dies given to the steel and shipbuilding industries in Europe. An exception to my state-
ment that government production in manufacturing seems to be directed at saving jobs
is Airbus. With that enterprise, the Europeans are trying to pick a winner.Appendix A




Country Time Period Productivity** Total Manufacturing
Argentina 1976–77 47.5% 4.8% —
1978–80 50.1 4.6 —
Australia 1954–57 51.3 9.1 —
1958–62 56.0 10.4 —
1963–65 62.2 10.5 —
1966–69 68.6 10.3 —
1967–69 69.8 — 3.4%
1970–73 76.0 9.8 3.3
1974–77 77.1 9.2 3.9
1978–79 79.5 9.4 4.0
Austria 1970–73 56.6 15.8 —
1970–75 58.2 — 23.0†
1974–75 61.4 15.6 —
1976–77 64.8 14.5 —
1978–79 66.6 14.5 —
Bangladesh 1974 9.6 5.7 62.0†
1975–77 9.7 — 69.2†
1978 10.3 — 70.6†
Benin 1976 5.7 7.6 —
Bolivia 1971–73 15.8 10.2 —
1973–75 16.8 — 5.9
1974–77 17.7 12.1 —
Botswana 1974–77 11.3 7.7 —
1978–79 14.0 7.3 —
Burma 1980 3.3 — 56.2
Chile 1974–77 28.8 15.2 —
1978–80 32.3 13.0 —
Denmark 1965 53.2 6.9 —
1974 61.6 6.3 —
Ethiopia 1979–80 2.1 — 60.9
France 1959–61 39.7 12.7 —
1962–65 47.2 12.8 —
1966–69 56.4 12.8 —
1970–73 67.3 12.2 —
1974 72.2 11.9 —
Germany, 1976–77 74.2 10.3 —




Country Time Period Productivity** Total  Manufacturing
Greece 1975 40.1% 5.8% 1.7%
1979 45.8 6.1 1.3
Guatemala 1978–80 26.6 1.1 —
Guinea 1979 3.9 25.0 —
Guyana 1973 19.8 12.7 —
1974–77 22.0 22.8 —
1978–80 17.0 37.2 —
India 1960–61 5.2 5.3 —
1962–65 5.5 6.1 —
1966–69 5.1 6.5 —
1970–73 5.9 7.3 13.1
1974–77 6.1 9.8 16.2
1978 6.7 10.3 15.7
Italy 1967–70 52.5 7.0 —
1970–73 59.2 7.1 —
1974–77 66.4 7.7 —
1978 71.2 7.5 —
Ivory Coast 1979 15.0 10.5 25.2†
Kenya 1964–65 4.1 7.5 —
1966–69 4.6 8.1 —
1970–73 5.1 8.7 13.1
Korea 1963–64 8.7 5.5 14.8
1970–73 15.1 7.0 17.3
1974–77 19.6 6.4 14.9
Liberia 1977 7.7 6.8 —
Mali 1975–77 4.3 11.2 —
1978 4.5 9.4 —
Malta 1962–65 13.5 3.7 —
1966–69 17.0 4.2 —
1970–73 22.1 4.2 —
1974–77 28.5 3.8 —
1978–80 35.4 4.2 —
Nepal 1971–73 4.6 1.1 4.0
1974–75 4.6 1.3 4.4
Netherlands 1971–73 78.6 3.6 —Public Enterprise* 
Share of Output
Relative
Country Time Period Productivity** Total Manufacturing
Pakistan 1961 6.2% 4.5% —
1966 8.8 4.1 —
1970–73 9.6 4.4 4.1%
1974–75 9.3 6.0 7.8
Paraguay 1970–73 13.3 2.9 —
1974–77 15.7 2.7 —
1978–80 19.8 3.1 —
Philippines 1974–77 13.5 1.7 —
Portugal 1976 31.4 14.3 12.0
Senegal 1970 7.1 8.4 —
1974 6.7 19.9 19.0
Sierra Leone 1979 9.0 7.6 14.2
Singapore 1972 32.7 — 14.2
Somalia 1974–77 4.2 — 59.1§
Spain 1979 63.0 4.1 —
Sri Lanka 1961 9.3 4.8 —
1966 10.1 6.1 7.6
1974 10.8 9.9 33.5
Taiwan 1951–53 7.0 11.9 —
1954–57 8.5 11.7 —
1958–61 9.8 13.5 —
1962–65 11.8 14.1 —
1966–69 14.8 13.6 —
1970–73 19.3 13.3 —
1974–77 24.0 13.6 —
1978–80 30.5 13.5 —
Tanzania 1966–69 2.2 9.3 14.9
1970–73 2.5 12.7 31.9
1974–77 2.9 12.3 37.9
Thailand 1969 8.4 3.5 —
1970–73 9.3 3.6 5.2
Togo 1980 5.0 11.8 —
Tunisia 1969 15.0 25.9 —
1978–79 23.6 25.4 —
Turkey 1952 7.2% 7.0% —
1957 9.4 7.0 —
1962–65 10.8 7.0 —
1966–69 13.1 7.6 —
1970–73 15.6 8.1 —
1974–77 19.5 5.8 —
1978–81 20.1 5.2 —
1982 19.7 5.8 —
United Kingdom 1962–65 47.2 10.3 —
1966–69 51.9 10.4 —
1970–73 57.2 10.0 —
1974–77 59.9 11.3 —
1978–81 63.1 10.9 —
1982 62.7 11.2 —
Venezuela 1972–73 73.4 2.9 —
1974–77 73.1 15.0 —
1978–80 72.0 27.5 —
Zambia 1972 10.1 37.8 —
Short (1984) defines public enterprises as government-owned enterprises that engage
in commercial activities and that have market sales which cover a substantial portion of
operating costs.
Relative productivity is defined as the country's real GDP per worker as a percentage
  of U.S. real GDP per worker in 1985. It is constructed from the variable RGDPPW
(in 1985 international prices).
  These numbers are for the combined manufacturing and mining sectors.
  This number is for the combined manufacturing and electricity sectors.
Sources:
Relative productivity: Summers and Heston 1991
Public enterprise share of total output: Short 1984, pp. 116–22, Table 1
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Public Enterprise Share of Output in Taiwan











Source: Schive 1995Appendix C
Two Historical Notes
Why did Taiwan succeed in cutting its public enterprise share
ofmanufacturingoutput?WhydidGreatBritainovercomepres-
sures to increase its share? One common thread to their experi-
ences was outside pressure from the United States to limit gov-
ernmentmanufacturingproduction.Inthisappendix,letmevery
brieﬂy allude to the United States’ inﬂuence on these countries.
Taiwan
Many public enterprises were established in Taiwan during the
1940sasthegovernmenttookcontrolofformerlyJapanese-con-
trolled businesses. These public enterprises, and the whole idea
of public ownership, became a point of contention between the
United States and Taiwan when the United States took an inter-
est in Taiwan after the start of the Korean War. According to
Wade (1990, p. 84), “the United States wanted a strong and sta-
ble outpost on its western defenses, and ...ashowcase of non-
communist development to contrast with communist develop-
mentonthe mainland.”The UnitedStates sawpublic ownership
as contrary to these goals. In order to convince the Taiwanese
of its views, the United States used its aid as leverage. As Wade
(1990, p. 83) argues,
Aid also helped to strengthen the role of the private sector. U.S. ad-
visors used their aid leverage to check the hostility that Nationalist
officials had shown toward private business on the mainland, and to
exert pressureatthe margininfavor ofusingaidfor creatingorhelp-
ing private ﬁrms. U.S. officials themselves sought out private inves-
tors for new projects (as in plastics, rayon, and glass), and in several
instancesblockedattemptsbytheNationalistgovernmenttoputproj-
ects under public ownership. They also successfully thwarted plans
to undertake several large-scale, capital-intensive projects, such as
a steel mill, an airline, and a nuclear reactor. The ﬁrst plastics plant
in 1957 was a key battle; many hardliners in the Nationalist party
fought to have it as a public enterprise, and their defeat marked a
turning point in acceptance within large parts of government that
new industries, even if in some sense strategic for the rest of the
economy, did not have to be located in the public sector.
So, a precedent was established that many new industries
were to be private, not public. This precedent alone would
imply that the public enterprise share of manufacturing output
would fall. Not only was such a precedent set, but there were
also divestitures of existing public ﬁrms. Schive (1995) docu-
ments that by the early 1950s, Taiwan began selling public en-
terprises. In 1953, Taiwan passed its Statute for the Transfer of
Public Enterprises to Private Ownership. Schive presents infor-
mation on some of the public enterprises sold during the 1950s
and 1960s (such as the Taiwan Cement Corporation, Taiwan Pa-
perandPulpCorporation,theIndustrialandMiningCorporation,
and Taiwan Machinery Manufacturing).
Great Britain
When the Labour Party rose to power in Great Britain after
World War II, it had plans to nationalize many industries. An
interestingquestioniswhyitnationalizedsofewindustries.This
question is addressed by Singleton (1995). He brieﬂy discusses
the United States’ role in this affair. As Singleton (1995, p. 24)
explains,
Labour also had to keep an eye on the political mood in the United
States, where nationalisation was viewed by the right as a threat to
democracy. Senator James P. Kem of Missouri and Senator Homer
Ferguson of Michigan opposed giving aid to Britain whilst Labour
continued to nationalise private property. While there is no evidence
to suggest that these protests affected US policy, they served as a re-
minder that socialist Britain was a welfare beneﬁciary of the mid-
western taxpayer and had to watch its step.References
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Comparing Two Measures of the Role 
of Public Enterprises
Public Enterprise Share of Output vs. Relative Productivity*
Chart 1   Public Enterprise Share of Total Output . . .






Chart 2   . . . And Share of Manufacturing Output**
   Relative productivity is defined as the country's real GDP per worker as a percentage of U.S. real 
GDP per worker in 1985.
Data plotted as squares include mining or electricity as well as manufacturing.
Sources:  Short 1984, Summers and Heston 1991











Some Large Differences Across Countries
Public Enterprise Share of Manufacturing Output in the 1970s
Industrialized World￿￿ Developing World￿
Australia (1974–77)￿ 3.9%￿ Bangladesh (1978)  ￿ 70.6%*
Austria (1970–75)￿ 23.0*￿ Burma (1980)￿ 56.2
Belgium (1974)￿ 0￿ †￿ Egypt (1979)￿ 63.0
Denmark (1974)￿ 0￿￿ Ethiopia (1979–80)￿ 60.9
France (1973)￿ 4.1†￿ Somalia (1974–77)￿ 59.1§
Italy (1971–73)￿ 7.6†￿ Sri Lanka (1974)￿ 33.5
United Kingdom (1975)￿ 3.0￿ Syria (1977)￿ 58.0
United States (1974)￿ 0￿ Tanzania (1974–77)￿ 37.9
￿ ￿ Tunisia (1978–81)￿ 60.1
￿ ￿ Zambia (1979–80)￿ 56.4
*These numbers are for the combined manufacturing and mining sectors.
†These numbers are public enterprise shares of manufacturing employment. Belgium's number is
￿ an estimate. The source below presents a table that provides a breakdown of employment in
￿ public enterprises by sector according to transport and communication, finance, public utilities,
￿ and other sectors. In the category other sectors (which includes manufacturing), there are only
￿ 1,100 employees. The author concludes that public enterprise employment makes up only a
￿ trivial fraction of manufacturing employment. France's number is also an estimate. The source
￿ below lists 223,000 public enterprise employees in manufacturing in 1973. In 1973, there were
￿ approximately 5.5 million employees in manufacturing (from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995),
￿ so that public enterprises accounted for 4.1 percent of manufacturing employment.
§This number is for the combined manufacturing and electricity sectors.
￿ Sources:
￿ Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Burma, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania:  Short 1984
￿ Belgium: Keyser and Windle 1978, vol. 1, p. 48, Table 4.1
￿ Denmark: Keyser and Windle 1978, vol. 2, p. 5, Table 1.1
￿ Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia: Aharoni 1986, p. 24
￿ France: Keyser and Windle 1978, vol. 4, p. 32, Table 3.4
￿ Italy: Keyser and Windle 1978, vol. 5, p. 151, Table 8.2
￿ United Kingdom: Keyser and Windle 1978, vol. 7, p. 43, Table 3.4
￿ United States: Author's estimate
￿ Zambia: Steel and Evans 1984, p. 62Chart 3
Comparing the Two Measures in Taiwan
Public Enterprise Share of Output in Taiwan, 1952–90






Source:  Schive 1995
Manufacturing
Total